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ENCLOSURE "A"

Authority

MILT-

77-75

By

HC/OB NLT

Date

MAY 30 1978

DRAFT

MESSAGE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF FAR EAST

RESTRICTED DATA

1. The Army, Air Force, and/or Navy have not, as a team, demonstrated, by actual coordinated simulated atomic strikes, their capability to employ atomic weapons tactically in support of land forces.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have accordingly determined that simulated atomic strikes should be staged in Korea in order to demonstrate conclusively, under combat conditions, that we have the capability of employing atomic weapons tactically in support of land forces, with sufficient speed and accuracy to insure effectiveness on the targets, should such action later become necessary. Actual atomic weapons (less nuclear components) should be used for all phases of these operations, except actual flights over enemy territory, to insure that all procedures, such as assembly, testing, and loading of actual weapons, are thoroughly tested in the field. The actual drops on the enemy will be with conventional munitions.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

3. The CG, SAC and CINCPAC have been directed to coordinate with and assist you in planning and staging these exercises. You will submit appropriate reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which will indicate status and action being taken to alleviate limitations.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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ENCLOSURE "B"

Authority NLT 77-75

By HC/DBLT Date MAY 30 1978

DRAFT

MESSAGE TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC

RESTRICTED DATA

1. The Army, Air Force and/or Navy have not, as a team, demonstrated, by actual coordinated simulated atomic strikes, their capability to employ atomic weapons tactically in support of ground forces.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have accordingly determined that simulated atomic strikes should be staged in Korea in order to demonstrate conclusively under combat conditions that we have the capability of employing atomic weapons tactically in support of ground forces, with sufficient speed and accuracy to insure effectiveness on the targets, should such action later become necessary. Actual atomic weapons (less nuclear components) should be used for all phases of these operations,

except actual flights over enemy territory. To insure that all procedures, such as assembly, testing and loading of actual weapons, are thoroughly tested in the field. The actual drops on the enemy will be with conventional munitions.

3. CINCFE has been directed to stage these practice exercises and it is desired that you coordinate with and assist him in their planning and execution.

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~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

14 January 1965

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Mr. Bundy -

Authority OSD 3-2-79

By ip, NAES, Date 3-16-

This is generally an excellent address. Unfortunately, however, the Kaufmann conventional war doctrine comes out loud and clear in several places in a way that has never been seen before in policy statements. This could be very disturbing to our allies.

A few changes would eliminate this difficulty:

Page 3 -- Here and elsewhere tactical nuclear capabilities are separated from "limited war" capabilities. This stems from the view that nuclear weapons cannot be used without bringing on total war, and will be picked up by analysts as a new policy indicator. I would move the sentence introducing limited war ahead of the tactical nuclear statement. I would also add the following sentence to the tactical nuclear statement: "We now have the capability to use nuclear weapons under close control when we must to stop aggression."

Page 4 -- The comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact men under arms will also be used as an indicator of further movement toward reliance on conventional forces in Europe. In addition, it is a transparent exaggeration of US capabilities. Certain people on the DOD staff are fond of this comparison. It is evident, however, that such figures are meaningless -- the authors never bother to include the men under arms in Communist China and yet a great many of the men counted as NATO troops have no bearing on the military situation in Europe.

Page 12 -- The emphasis on conventional capabilities, including high speed cargo vessels, etc., cannot help but be interpreted by some as another step toward conventional defense in Europe. If the change on page 3 should be accepted, the latter interpretation would not have as great an effect. In addition, deletion of the first sentence of the last paragraph on page 12 would also help.

Page 35 -- In the second sentence of the conclusion, two types of forces are mentioned, "strategic forces" and "conventional forces." This is the essence of the Kaufmann doctrine, i.e., nuclear weapons should be used only as a strategic deterrent. The word "conventional" should be changed to "tactical."

I have also marked a few additional changes which I feel would improve the speech but are of less importance.

RCB

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

R. C. BOWMAN COPY

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Authority NLT 77-75

By HC/DB NLT Date MAY 30 1970

14 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: The Military Effectiveness and Desirability
of Employing Atomic Weapons Tactically in
Korea

RESTRICTED DATA

1. Reference is made to the request of Mr. Robert A. Levett to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments on a study prepared in the Department of the Army concerning the possible employment of atomic weapons in Korea, in the event that the present truce negotiations break down.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated this problem and have determined that under current conditions atomic weapons should be employed in the Far East ONLY in the event our forces in that area would otherwise be faced with a military disaster.

3. Foremost among the factors which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered in reaching the determination outlined in paragraph 2 above, is the extremely important one that tactical use of the weapon should not, short of urgent necessity, be undertaken prematurely, thus giving present and potential enemies opportunity to develop defenses against what would be new employment of an existing weapon. In short, it is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the initial tactical use of atomic bombs should, if possible, be for a major purpose in a major theater of war. Furthermore, decision to employ the atomic bomb tactically should be made only after full consideration is given to the fact that it may result in enlarging the present area of conflict, increased Soviet support through "volunteer" or puppet forces, compensatory pressure in other areas, or possibly the onset of full-scale hostilities.

4. However, present circumstances are such that a real and imminent threat of disaster could develop at any time. A possible

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By HC/DB NLT

Date MAY 30 1976

critical point could be a failure of truce negotiations concurrently with the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

5. Forces are now located in the Far East which, providing target intelligence is adequate, are capable of delivering atomic weapons to tactical targets in support of land forces in Korea. Delivery of atomic weapons on preplanned targets presents little difficulty. However, the weak link in applying this capability to an urgent and rapidly developing ground situation is the lack of tested methods and procedures for providing tactical atomic support of engaged land forces.

6. ~~AS DEFINED BY~~ Subject to your concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to dispatch directives to Commander in Chief Far East, Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, and Commander in Chief, Pacific (copies attached) requiring them to conduct practice atomic strikes in tactical support of ground forces to improve techniques and procedures in case such employment of atomic

weapons becomes necessary in the future.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

7. Actual atomic weapons, less nuclear components, will be used in these operations, except in actual flights over enemy territory, to insure that all procedures, such as assembly, testing, and loading of actual weapons, are thoroughly tested in the field.

8. The foregoing preparatory measures can be taken without material delay or impairment of our ability to launch strategic air operations as planned.

9. Existing structure of command and organization, with augmentation at certain levels, is adequate to undertake tactical atomic operations. It is not considered necessary or desirable to superimpose special advisory staff elements of the type indicated in the study referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Mr. Lovett.

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10. A Presidential Directive, as recommended in the Department of Army study, referred to in paragraph 1 above, is not considered necessary as preparation and training for possible use of a capability is purely a military function.

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

A S D E F I N E D B Y

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By HC/DB NLT Date MAY 30 1978

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

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Enclosures "A" and "B"

21 November 1950

Pages 1-2, incl.

251E

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC BOMBS IN KOREA

The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, dated 20 November 1950, has been referred to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for the preparation, as a matter of priority, of comments and recommendations as to:

- a. The conditions under which the employment of atomic bombs in Korea would be indicated;
- b. What additional preparations if any, policy-wise, should be undertaken to insure the ability to use the atomic bomb if and when deemed appropriate;
- c. The determination of targets suitable for atomic attack that might present themselves from a above; and
- d. The determination of additional preparations if any, operational-wise, which should be undertaken to insure the ability to use atomic bombs if and when deemed appropriate.

W. G. LALOR,

L. K. LADUE,

Joint Secretariat.

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JCS 2173

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ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC BOMBS IN KOREA

20 November 1950

1. The apparent overt intervention of Chinese Communist forces in the Korean conflict and their capability further to augment the forces opposing Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), raises anew the question of possible use by UN forces of the atomic bomb. While, at the present time, it appears that conventional air strikes will be effective in preventing any buildup of enemy forces sufficient to threaten the UN position, I feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should bring this problem under study.

2. It is conceivable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be required to present their views concerning the use of the atomic bomb in Korea on short notice. It is also conceivable that, in the event of an all-out effort by the Chinese Communists, the use of atomic bombs against troop and materiel concentrations might be the decisive factor in enabling the UN forces to hold a defensive position or to effect the early drive to the Manchurian border.

3. In view of the above I consider that a study should be made to determine the conditions under which the employment of atomic bombs would be indicated, the targets suitable for atomic attack that might present themselves under these conditions, and what additional preparations, if any, both policy-wise and operational-wise, we should be undertaking to insure our ability to use this bomb if and when we deem it appropriate.

4. I recommend, therefore, that this matter be referred to the appropriate committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendations as a matter of priority.

3210 263

30 SEP 1958

MEMORANDUM
RM-4900-ISA
DECEMBER 1958

THE 1958 TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS:
A DOCUMENTED HISTORY (U)

M. H. Halperin

This research is sponsored by the Department of Defense, under Contract SD-390, monitored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). Views or conclusions contained in the Memorandum should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the Department of Defense.

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American 240's as a means of bargaining to obtain GRC agreement to reduce the strength on the Offshore Islands by at least 15,000 men. He reported that he had obtained Chiang's concurrence on the best possible terms. 102

On November 28 General Peng, Commander in Chief of the Army of the Republic of China, in a conversation with General Taylor, stated that Chiang had agreed to a reduction of forces on Quemoy by 15,000 men, provided it were done gradually and firepower were increased. He listed the needed firepower increases and urged increased aid. 103

On December 9, 1958, the formal U.S. - GRC agreement was approved by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

By the end of December the United States had completed an agreement with the GRC which was to lead to reduction of approximately 15,000 men in the manpower on Quemoy.

DULLES AND THE ROLE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

On November 7 Secretary of State Dulles (accompanied by Herter, Murphy, Robertson, Smith and others from State) was, at his request, briefed by a representative of the JCS

at the Pentagon on the effects of nuclear weapons with particular reference to Taiwan.¹⁰⁴ At the conclusion of the briefing, which lasted less than an hour, Dulles asked whether nuclear weapons could be used to take out the artillery pieces opposite Quemoy without extensive civilian damage both in the Amoy area and on Quemoy and Taiwan. The colonel giving the briefing referred the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰⁵

After much discussion of the subject and considerable disagreement both among the Services and between the Services and the Joint Staff, Dulles was informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 8 that:

the batteries could be rendered ineffective by a combination of destruction or damage to the guns and gun emplacements and by inflicting casualties to the personnel operating these guns. By employing air-burst weapons, this could be accomplished with no significant radioactive fall-out implications in either the Amoy area or on Quemoy/Taiwan. Several types of atomic weapons and delivery systems, capable of achieving the above, are available in the area.¹⁰⁶

WARSAW TALKS

The first meeting of the Sino-American talks after the initial Chinese Communist ceasefire was held on October 10.